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Nontechnical Summary
Taking account of sinks credits as agreed in Bonn and Marrakech, this paper illustrates how
market power could be exerted in the absence of the US ratification under Annex 1 trading
and explores the potential implications of the non-competitive supply behavior for the
international market of tradable permits, compliance costs for the remaining Annex 1
countries to meet their revised Kyoto targets, and the environmental effectiveness. Our results
show that the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol has had by far the greatest impact on
the environmental effectiveness of the Protocol. This would lead to no real emission reduction
in all remaining Annex 1 regions. As the biggest single buyer on the permit market, the
absence of US ratification would significantly reduce the demand for permits. Consequently,
the price of permits under Annex 1 trading would drop to zero. While all remaining Kyoto-
constrained Annex 1 countries would enjoy meeting their revised Kyoto targets at zero costs,
seller countries with excess supply of hot air would lose all their revenues under perfect
Annex 1 trading.
Given the former Soviet Union (FSU) and the Eastern European countries (EEC) as
the dominant suppliers of emissions permits on the international market, it seems likely that
they would exert market power to maximize their revenues from permit sales. Depending on
how market power is exerted, our results show that the overall compliance costs of all
remaining Annex 1 regions in the case of FSU cooperating with EEC could reach as much as
two times that in the case of only FSU acting as a monopoly. But no matter how market
power is exerted, all Kyoto-constrained Annex 1 regions are better off with emissions trading
in terms of their compliance costs than with no trading at all. Moreover, curtailing permit
supply by market power will cut the amount of hot air being emitted into the atmosphere by
more than half and at the same time, increase Annex 1 domestic abatement efforts. Thus, the
overall environmental effectiveness is increased, although it is much less under the market
power scenarios examined than in the case of the ratification of all Annex 1 regions including
the US.
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Abstract
Taking account of sinks credits as agreed in Bonn and Marrakech, this paper illustrates how
market power could be exerted in the absence of the US ratification under Annex 1 trading
and explores the potential implications of non-competitive supply behavior for the
international market of tradable permits, compliance costs for the remaining Annex 1
countries to meet their revised Kyoto targets, and the environmental effectiveness. Our results
show that the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol has great impact on the economic costs
and environmental effectiveness of the Protocol since it would lead to no real emission
reduction in all remaining Annex 1 regions. Depending on how market power is exerted by
the dominant permit suppliers, the former Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries,
the overall compliance costs of all remaining Annex 1 regions differ significantly. Moreover,
curtailing permit supply by market power increases substantially the overall environmental
effectiveness by cutting the amount of hot air being emitted into the atmosphere by more than
half, although to much less extent than in the case of the US compliance.
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11. Introduction
The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) imposes greenhouse gas emission limits for Annex 1 countries (i.e., the OECD
countries and countries with economies in transition) as listed in Annex B of the Protocol.
Together, Annex 1 countries must reduce their emissions of six greenhouse gases (GHG) by
5.2% below 1990 levels over the commitment period 2008-2012. The Protocol also
incorporates emissions trading, joint implementation and the clean development mechanism
(CDM) to help Annex 1 countries meet their Kyoto targets at a lower overall cost, but it
leaves all of the details concerning these flexibility mechanisms open for further negotiations.
The Protocol will become effective once it has been ratified by at least 55 parties whose CO2
emissions represent at least 55% of the total emissions from all Annex 1 parties in the year
1990.
The sixth Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP6) held in the Hague,
November 2000, aimed to finalize the procedures and institutions needed to make the Kyoto
Protocol fully operational. During the negotiations leading up to the conference, the long and
contentious debates between the European Union on the one hand and the US and other
members of the Umbrella Group1 on the other hand had centered on the two issues. The first
contentious issue is to what extent Annex 1 countries could count their carbon absorbing
forests and agricultural lands (the so-called sinks) against their emissions targets. The
Americans were keen on the broadest and most generous definitions of sinks absorbing
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, while the Europeans wanted sharp curbs on the use of
sinks. The clash between the US and the European Union (EU) over the extent of usage of the
sinks to meet their emissions targets was blamed, in part, for the breakdown of the climate
negotiations of the COP6. The second contentious issue is to what extent Annex 1 countries
are allowed to use the flexibility mechanisms to meet their emissions targets. On the one
hand, the US and other Umbrella Group members advocated unrestricted emissions trading.
On the other hand, the EU put forward a proposal for quantitative ceilings on the use of
flexibility mechanisms (European Union, 1999), insisting that domestic abatement actions
should be a main means of meeting emissions reductions required of each Annex 1 country
                                               
1
 The Umbrella Group refers to the so-called JUSSCANNZ countries (Japan, the United States, Switzerland,
Canada, Australia, Norway, New Zealand). It meets daily during the international climate change negotiations to
exchange information and discuss substance/strategy on issues where there is common ground.
2(in other words, at least half of the emissions reductions required have to be undertaken
domestically). This supplementary requirement caused the deepest division between the EU
and the Umbrella Group countries and was regarded as one of the main causes for the collapse
of the COP6.
Soon after coming into office, the President Bush decided that the US would withdraw
from the Kyoto Protocol. Quick to accept that the US would not re-enter the negotiations, the
EU led a sustained diplomatic effort to keep the Kyoto Protocol alive (Legge, 2001). While
the Group of 77 (G77) and China2 moderated some of their demands, the EU softened its
stance on the extent of usage of sinks and flexibility mechanisms to secure the reluctant
support of other Umbrella Group members for the Protocol at the resumed COP6 held in
Bonn, July 2001. After tough negotiations, the political compromises were eventually reached
on a number of key implementation issues of the Kyoto Protocol. This political deal, called
the Bonn Agreement, was translated into the detailed legal text, called the Marrakech
Accords, at the seventh Conference of the Parties (COP7) to the UNFCCC held in Marrakech,
November 2001, which was expected to be easy but turned out to be another difficult meeting.
The Kyoto Protocol, as detailed in the Marrakech Accords, has been rendered fit for its
ratification at the World Summit on Sustainable Development to be held Johannesburg,
September 2002.
The Bonn Agreement allows for significant credits for carbon dioxide sinks.
Specifically, the following activities related to land use, land use change and forestry
(LULUCF) are allowed to be counted as sinks: forest management under Article 3.4, whose
credits are capped to country-specific limits as given in Appendix Z and which total 83
million tons of carbon (MtC) per year;3 agricultural land management and revegetation
activities under Article 3.4 on a net-net accounting basis without an explicit cap; afforestation
and reforestation projects to be eligible under the CDM, whose contribution to a party’s
                                               
2
 As has been the case at the international climate change negotiations, the developing countries express their
consensus views as the Group of 77 and China’s positions. Divergent or dissenting views are then expressed
separately, representing either individual countries or smaller groups, such as the Alliance of Small Island States
(AOSIS).
3
 At the COP7 to the UNFCCC, the Russian Federation demanded the renegotiation of the designated amount
from forest management activities, and succeeded in increasing the amount from 17.63 megatons of carbon per
year specified in Appendix Z under the Bonn Agreement to 33 megatons. This revision led to the new total of 98
MtC, provided that an initial figure of 28 MtC for the US was included.
3assigned amount is capped at 1% of five times the party’s base year emissions (UNFCCC,
2001).
With the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, the EU dropped its previous
insistence on a cap on the use of flexibility mechanisms. The final wording at the Bonn
Agreement is now that “domestic action shall thus constitute a significant element of the
effort” by each Annex 1 country. This is a very important and positive development because it
will allow countries and businesses to reduce their emissions wherever it is cheapest to do so.
Ironically, it is a development that the US had lobbied intensively for during previous rounds
of international climate negotiations.
Earlier economic modeling studies focus on investigating economic efficiency and
environmental effectiveness of meeting the original Kyoto reduction target of 5.2%, with
and/or without considering the imposition of restrictions on the use of emissions trading (e.g.
Bernstein et al., 1999; Bollen et al., 1999; Criqui and Viguier, 2000; Criqui et al., 1999;
Ellerman and Decaux, 1998; Ellerman, Jacoby and Decaux, 1998; Ellerman and Wing, 2000;
Manne and Richels, 1999; Paltsev, 2000; Weyant, 1999; Zhang, 2000b, 2001). The results,
among others, show that the US is expected to be the biggest single buyer on the international
market of tradable permits, and that restrictions on the use of emissions trading to comply
with the Kyoto emissions targets will result in substantial efficiency losses. The US
withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol breaks the balance of the buyers and sellers on the
international permit market. The most recent studies focus on the implications of the US
withdrawal from the Protocol. A large part of these studies assume perfectly competitive
behavior, and show that the US non-ratification leads to a sharp drop in the price of permits
on the international market so that the remaining Kyoto-constrained Annex 1 countries can
meet their Kyoto targets at much lower costs (Hagem and Holtsman, 2001; Den Elzen and de
Moor, 2001; Eyckmans et al., 2001). With the over-supply of permits, it seems likely that
sellers would adapt their behaviors to the weaker demand for emissions permits to maximize
their gains. Dominant sellers might defer portion of their excess emissions permits for use in
subsequent periods and/or exploit their market power on the permits market (Manne and
Richels, 2001; Buchner et al., 2001). Manne and Richels (2001) have examined the
implications of allowing banking of permits, an intertemporal flexibility that allows countries
to carry permits that are unused in one commitment period forward for use in the subsequent
periods. They have found that the reduction in the compliance costs of the remaining Annex 1
4countries in the absence of the US ratification would be smaller than what have been
suggested.
In the absence of the US ratification, market power on the supply side of the permit
market seems likely to be a real issue. The ongoing international climate negotiations might
give us some indications. With the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, Russian
participation is essential for the Protocol to enter into force.4 As would be expected, the
Russian Federation has exploited its increased bargaining power by further reducing its
obligations. As observed at the recently completed COP7 where the EU and the G77 and
China were determined to strike a deal that would ensure sufficient ratification for entry into
force of the Protocol, the Russian Federation, both individually and collectively with other
members of the Umbrella Group, used this leverage to compel the EU and G77/China to
concede many of their demands (IISD, 2001). Despite the insistence of almost all parties that
the Bonn Agreement was sacrosanct, the Russian Federation demanded the renegotiation of
the designated amount from forest management activities, and succeeded in increasing the
amount from 17.63 MtC per year to 33 MtC.
Several studies have explored the implications of organizing a sellers’ cartel (e.g.,
Böhringer and Löschel, 2001; Manne and Richels, 2001). But, in our view, there is an ample
space for non-competitive supply behavior under Annex 1 emissions trading, and the realistic
scenario of market power may lie somewhere in between the extreme scenarios of the perfect
competition and the coordinated monopoly. Taking account of sinks credits as agreed in Bonn
and Marrakech, this paper aims to illustrate how market power could be exerted in the
absence of the US ratification under Annex 1 trading and to explore the potential implications
of the non-competitive supply behavior for the international market of tradable permits,
compliance costs for the remaining Annex 1 countries to meet their revised Kyoto targets, and
the environmental effectiveness. Section 2 provides baseline emissions in 2010 for all Annex
1 regions, effective emissions reductions in all Kyoto-constrained Annex 1 regions and the
size of hot air for those Kyoto-unconstrained Annex 1 regions. Section 3 discusses the
analytical framework to study the effects of non-competitive supply behavior in the absence
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 The US contributes 36.1% of the total Annex 1 CO2 emissions in the year 1990, whereas the Russian
Federation is responsible for 17.4% (UNFCCC, 1997). The entry into force requires that countries representing
at least 55% of the total CO2 emissions from Annex 1 countries in 1990 ratify the Protocol. Thus, the US and
countries responsible for more than 8.9% of the total can block the Protocol from entering into force, implying
that Russian ratification is required for the Protocol to enter into force.
5of the US ratification under Annex 1 emissions trading. Section 4 describes our partial
equilibrium model based on the marginal abatement costs of seven Annex 1 regions, with the
algebraic exposition of the model given in Appendix B. Section 5 presents the policy
scenarios examined, whereas Section 6 discusses all simulation results. The paper ends with
the main conclusions and further research.
2. Baseline emissions, the mandated reductions and the size of hot air
The magnitude and distribution of abatement costs of meeting the Kyoto emission
constraints depend crucially on the business-as-usual (BAU) projections for emissions. This
study takes the year 2010 as representative of the first commitment period 2008-2012. Like
other economic modeling studies on compliance costs (see Weyant, 1999), the study focuses
only on CO2, partly because CO2 is the most important of the six greenhouse gases considered
under the Kyoto Protocol, and partly because of lack of appropriate abatement cost data for
non-CO2 greenhouse gases.
5
 Moreover, because it is a daunting task to estimate the marginal
abatement cost for each Annex 1 country, we do so at a regional level. We aggregate Annex 1
countries into seven regions; Australia and New Zealand (AUN), Canada (CAN), Europe
Union (EUR), Japan (JPN), the US (USA), Eastern Europe (EEC) and the former Soviet
Union (FSU) (see Appendix A for the corresponding Annex 1 countries covered in each
region). The first five Kyoto-constrained regions belong to the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD). Historical CO2 emissions for each Annex 1 country
in the base year 1990 as well as its projected CO2 emissions in 2010 are derived from the US
Department of Energy (DOE, 2001). They are aggregated into the above seven Annex 1
regions, as given in Table 1. The table also contains the nominal percentage reductions with
respect to (wrt) 1990 emissions levels and the effective percentage reductions with respect to
baseline emissions in 2010 for both the original Kyoto emissions targets and the revised
targets under the Bonn Agreement and the Marrakech Accords. The latter are based on the
preliminary estimates by the European Commission factoring into the amount of sinks credits
as agreed in Bonn and Marrakech (Nemry, 2001). As a result of allowing countries to count
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 Inclusion of non-CO2 greenhouse gases will lower absolute compliance costs, given that other greenhouse
gases but CO2 can be cut at lower costs. But, as Manne and Richels (2001) point out, the focus on CO2 would not
alter the general insights from this kind of analysis.
6the amount of sinks credits, the average reduction target for the Annex 1 countries as a whole
is reduced to 1.9%, in comparison to the original reduction target of 5.2% (see Table 1).
It can be seen that CO2 emissions in all the OECD countries in 2010 are expected to
continue to rise under the BAU scenario. Consequently, their effective percentage reductions
from their projected baseline emissions are much higher than their nominal percentage
reductions. Even if the sinks credits are factored into, meeting the Kyoto targets still requires
a drastic reduction in emissions for AUN, CAN, EUR, JPN and USA.
The situation in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is quite different. The
economic transition led to a large decline in emissions as economies contracted and energy
markets were deregulated since the collapse of the Soviet Union. By 1996, greenhouse gas
emissions in these countries had declined 20-46% below their base year levels (Zhang, 2001).
Although economies are projected to begin recovering during the period under review,
emissions in most countries with economies in transition in 2010 are expected to remain
below their base year levels. In other words, these countries are allocated assigned amounts
under the Kyoto Protocol that exceed their anticipated emissions requirements even in the
absence of any limitation. If emissions trading were allowed, these countries would be able to
trade these excess emissions to other countries, thus creating the hot air that would otherwise
have not occurred in the absence of emissions trading (Zhang, 1998, 2000a). Because the
transfer of the hot air does not represent any real emissions reductions by the selling
countries, allowing the acquisition of the surplus from the selling countries to meet the buying
countries’ commitments makes the total emissions even higher than what would be in the
absence of emissions trading, although not above the aggregate Kyoto targets (Zhang, 2000b).
The hot air problem is particularly acute in Russia and the Ukraine. But the exact
amount of hot air is by its nature uncertain. This depends particularly on expectations for
economic recovery and developments in the energy sector in Russia and Ukraine. Optimistic
expectations for economic recovery increases benchmark carbon emissions in 2010, shifting
aggregate demand curves outwards and aggregate supply curves inwards on the international
permit market, leading to a smaller amount of hot air than those projected based on less
optimistic expectations for economic recovery. Most economic modeling studies project a
size of hot air in the range from 111 MtC to 374 MtC in 2010 (Paltsev, 2000; Zhang, 2000b).
Our projections of hot air for Russia and the Ukraine are based on the most recent projections
for baseline carbon emission by the US Department of Energy (DOE, 2001). As indicated in
7Table 1, comparing the official DOE baseline projections for 2010 with the revised Kyoto
emissions targets suggests a size of hot air of 296 MtC for FSU and 56 MtC for EEC. The
withdrawal of the US as the world largest potential buyer of emissions permits leads to an
excess supply of hot air of 54 MtC. If emissions permits were fully tradable among all
remaining Annex 1 countries, a competitive market of permits would drive down the
international price of permits to zero so that no real emissions reductions in Annex 1 countries
at all would occur with respect to their BAU emissions.
Table 1 Quantitative implications of the Marrakech Accords
Regiona Baseline
emissions
(MtC)b
Nominal
reduction
(% wrt 1990)c
Effective
reduction
(% wrt 2010)
Absolute
cutback
(MtC wrt 2010)
1990 2010 w/o sinks w/t sinks w/o sinks w/t sinks w/o sinks w/t sinks
AUN 88 130 – 6.8 – 9.4 27.6 25.9 36 34
CAN 126 165 6.0 – 5.2 28.2 19.7 47 32
EUR 930 1040 7.8 6.2 17.5 16.1 182 168
JPN 269 330 6.0 1.1 23.4 19.4 77 64
EEC 279 209 7.1 4.9 – 24.0 – 26.9 -50 – 56
FSU 853 593 0 – 4.2 – 43.8 – 49.8 –260 – 296
Total w/o USd 2545 2467 4.3 0.9 1.3 – 2.2 32 – 54
USA 1345 1809 7.0 3.7 30.9 28.4 558 514
Total w/t USe 3890 4276 5.2 1.9 13.8 10.8 590 460
a AUN – Australia and New Zealand; CAN – Canada; EUR - OECD Europe (including EFTA); JPN – Japan;
EEC - Central and Eastern European countries; FSU - Former Soviet Union.
b Baseline emissions in 2010 based on DOE (2001) reference case.
c Estimates based on UNFCCC and FAO data (Nemry, 2001).
d Annex 1 total without the US ratification.
e Annex 1 total with the US ratification.
83. The effects of market power in international emissions trading
A number of theoretical and empirical studies have examined the issue of market
power on tradable quota markets (e.g., Hahn, 1984; Misolek and Elder, 1989; Malueg, 1990;
Westkog, 1996; Sartzetakis, 1997; Burniaux, 1998; Ellerman and Decaux, 1998; Ellerman
and Wing, 2000; Godby, 2000). They show that either dominant buyers
(monopsony/oligopsony) or sellers (monopoly/oligopoly) may be able to exert market power
on the permit market or use its market power on the permit market to gain power in the
product market. In the following discussion, market power refers only to the capacity to
influence the market price of traded permits (“cost minimizing manipulation”).
The impact of market power on the price of permits depends on who resides in such a
power. In the case of a monopsony, market power under emissions trading results in reduced
demand, whereas in the case of a monopoly market power under emissions trading results in
reduced supply. A monopsonist may thereby force the permit price below, a monopolist
above the competitive level (Misolek and Elder, 1989). Thus, the extent of competition on a
tradable permit market affects the efficiency of international emissions trading and the degree
to which potential cost savings are realized. Permit price manipulations result in additional
economic costs to achieve the same level of abatement as under a perfect competition and
increase the costs of compliance. Whether market power is a real issue in an international
greenhouse gas emissions trading depends on how such a trading scheme will take place.
Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol creates an intergovernmental emissions trading market next
to inter-source trading.6 In case of inter-source trading in which sub-national entities (e.g.,
firms) are authorized to trade on the international emissions permit market, the scope of
market power seems rather limited.7 Emissions trading modeled in many economic studies
(Weyant, 1999) operates as if governments retain the sole right to trade. As such, emissions
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 See Zhang (1998, 2000a) for a detailed discussion on inter-governmental emissions trading and inter-source
trading.
7
 Incorporating sub-national entities into an international emissions trading scheme would potentially increase the
total amount of transactions in the international scheme. Increasing the number of trades would help to improve
market liquidity and reduce the potential for abuse of market power. Hargrave (1998) shows that if an upstream
trading system, which targets fossil fuel producers and importers as regulated entities, were implemented in the
US, the total number of allowance holders would be restricted to about 1900. Even with such a relatively small
number of regulated sources, market power would not be an issue. In the above upstream system for the US, the
largest firm has only a 5.6 percent market allowance share. Firms, each having less than one percent share,
would hold the lion’s share of allowances  (Cramton and Kerr, 1998).
9trading takes place on a government-to-government basis. Since the majority of inexpensive
emissions permits are concentrated in the Eastern European and former Soviet Union
countries, these countries may be able to exert market power and extract sizeable economic
rents under this trading scheme. The scope for non-competitive supply behavior on Annex 1
permit market is significantly amplified by the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol and
the subsequent deals struck in Bonn and Marrakech. Factoring into the amount of sinks
credits in the deals, the amount of EEC and FSU hot air available at no costs exceeds the total
amount of emissions reductions required of all remaining Kyoto-constrained Annex 1
countries. The international permit price under Annex 1 trading falls to zero with perfectly
competitive supply behavior of EEC and FSU. In this case, emission sales do not create any
revenue for the two permit suppliers. Therefore, it seems plausible to assume that EEC and
FSU restrict permit supply as a result of monopolistic behavior in order to drive up the
international carbon price. Manne and Richels (1999) refer to this case as a sellers’ market.
On the demand side, competitive behavior seems to be the appropriate assumption. The
reason is that either firms of the OECD countries are allowed to engage in emissions trading
directly as proposed in the recent EU-wide emissions trading scheme,8 or coordination of
several individual OECD countries to organize a buyers’ cartel seems rather difficult in case
of intergovernmental emissions trading.
Given the revised emissions targets at the COP7, the effects of supply side restrictions
are illustrated in Figure 1. The amount of hot air (H) is greater than the total abatement
requirements of non-US Annex 1 countries (Qu). Consequently, market price under perfect
competition is zero (Pu = 0) and the quantity of permits traded equals the total abatement
requirement (Qu). There is no domestic abatement of Kyoto-constrained Annex 1 countries.
Emissions of permit importers equal the BAU emission levels ( )e . Total revenues for permit
exporting countries equal zero. With supply side restrictions, the supply of permits is reduced
from Su to Sr. This drives up the market price of permits from Pu to Pr. The total volume of
permits traded is reduced from Qu to Qr. The exercise of monopoly power entails a
redistribution of the gains from emissions trading from buyers to sellers and a loss of
efficiency. Permit exporters receive the rectangle IJK0, which represents the total income
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 On 23 October 2001, the Commission of European Communities (2001) adopted a proposal for implementing
EU-wide emissions trading. Such a scheme involves company trading, should start in 2005, and in the first phase
only covers CO2 emissions from large industrial and energy activities. These activities of about 4000-5000 major
polluters are estimated to account for about 46% of the EU’s total CO2 emissions in 2010.
10
from permit sales. They benefit from further supply restrictions as long as the gains from
higher prices are greater than the loss of revenues from a lower level of permits sold. Due to
the higher price of permits, importing countries increase domestic abatement (a), thus
reducing emissions from BAU emissions e  to e. The remaining abatement requirements up to
the revised Kyoto target (k) is met through permit import (q). The costs of compliance for a
permit importer increase to LMNW, of which LMVW is the income transfer to permit
exporters and MNV is the increased resource cost (deadweight loss). The economic efficiency
of emissions trading is reduced under market power since marginal abatement costs (C’) are
not equalized across regions. The loss in efficiency relative to the competitive case depends
on the amount of permits initially allocated to the regions (Hahn, 1984). With non-
competitive supply behavior, some part of hot air is suppressed (Qu – Qr) and thus the
environmental effectiveness is increased.
Figure 1  Effects of supply side restrictions
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4. Partial equilibrium model of non-competitive supply behavior
We assess the effects of non-competitive supply behavior in a partial equilibrium set-
up using marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves for different Annex 1 regions in the year
2010 (see Appendix B for the algebraic exposition of the model). These curves represent the
marginal cost of reducing carbon emissions by different amounts within an economy.
Marginal costs of abatement differ considerably across countries due to differences in the
carbon intensity, initial energy price levels and the substitution possibilities in the respective
economy.
The MAC curves used here are generated by the world energy system model POLES
(Criqui et al., 1996), which embodies a detailed bottom-up description of regional energy
markets and world-wide energy trade. To get the marginal abatement cost curves, we run the
model under progressively stringent carbon constraints for the year 2010. The shadow price of
carbon is plotted against the abatement levels and we fit a constant elasticity function to the
model results using a least-squares procedure. The coefficients of the marginal abatement cost
curve approximations of the form MAC = α⋅(ABATEMENT)β are given in Table 2.9 The
MAC analysis is a partial equilibrium approach since it does not consider all the spillover
effects of carbon abatement policies and monopolistic pricing on other markets. For instance,
abating countries do not take into account the effects of carbon reduction efforts on energy
prices and thereby its terms of trade. However, it provides a convenient way to analyze the
effects of different assumptions on non-competitive supply side behavior.
Table 2 Coefficients of MAC curve approximations MAC = α⋅(ABATEMENT)β
Coefficients AUN CAN EEC EUR FSU JPN USA
α 0.675 1.567 0.316 0.114 0.046 0.718 0.020
β 1.442 1.379 1.388 1.369 1.482 1.338 1.427
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 Ellerman and Decaux (1998) show that MAC curves generated in this way are robust with regard to emissions
trading policies (i.e. different levels of abatement among regions and the scope of emissions trading). Zhang
(2000b, 2001) has used the MACs of 12 regions to investigate the implications of quantitative limits on trading
for Annex 1 countries and non-Annex 1 countries as well as for the market price of permits.
12
 The marginal abatement cost curves for the Kyoto-constrained Annex 1 regions,
namely Australia and New Zealand (AUN), Canada (CAN), OECD Europe (EUR), and Japan
(JPN) as well as the US (USA), are displayed in Figure 2. From these MAC curves we can
derive the aggregate demand curve for permits of the Kyoto-constrained, i.e. importing Annex
1 regions, with and without the US participation. An Annex 1 region demands permits as long
as the market price of permits is lower than its autarkic marginal abatement costs. Conversely,
it supplies permits as long as the market price is above its autarkic marginal costs of
abatement. The demand curve is then obtained by simply adding up the potentially demanded
and supplied quantities of all Kyoto-constrained Annex 1 regions at each market price. If the
market price is equal to zero, which is the result under the assumption of perfect competition,
all constrained Annex 1 regions demand their Kyoto emission reduction requirements, which
sum up to 298 MtC and 812 MtC without and with the US participation, respectively. As the
price increases, the aggregate demand diminishes. When the market price reaches 108
US$/tC, the autarkic marginal abatement cost of AUN, this region switches from demanding
to supplying permits. The same happens at a price of 127 US$/tC for EUR. At a price of 140
US$/tC, the amount of permits supplied by AUN (7 MtC) and EUR (12 MtC) just equals the
demand by CAN (6 MtC) and JPN (13 MtC) resulting in an aggregate permit demand
(without the US) of zero.
Figure 2  Marginal abatement cost curves for Kyoto-constrained Annex 1 regions
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5. Formulation of policy scenarios
Using the marginal abatement cost curves of seven Annex 1 regions and the market
demand curve for permits (the curve D without the US participation and DUS with the US
participation in Figure 5), we will examine the following policy scenarios:
NOTRADE Each Annex 1 country must individually meet its Kyoto targets without any
trading of permits across national borders. This is equivalent to a case in which
each Annex 1 country applies domestic carbon tax that is high enough to meet
its individual Kyoto commitment. With the EU backing off earlier demand for
placing quantitative limits on trading, this scenario seems unlikely. But it
provides a useful reference point for examining the potential efficiency gains of
emissions trading and the corresponding environmental effectiveness.
TRADE All Annex 1 countries including FSU and EEC are allowed to trade emissions
permits with each other. Under the assumption of perfectly competitive supply
and demand behavior, all regions behave as price takers. There is no market
power exercised on the international permit market. We consider two variants:
one with the US (TRADE w/t US), and one without the US (TRADE w/o US).
This distinction aims to examine how the US withdrawal from the Protocol
affects compliance costs of other Annex 1 countries and environmental
effectiveness vis-à-vis full Annex 1 trading.
As discussed in Section 3, the assumption of perfectly competitive supply behavior
seems unrealistic. Given FSU and EEC as the dominant suppliers of emissions permits on the
international market, it is not in their interest to sell excess permits at zero price. Instead, they
may exert market power to maximize their revenues from selling permits. To illustrate how
market power could be exerted under Annex 1 trading and to explore the effects of the non-
competitive supply behavior, we set up the following three scenarios:
CARTEL FSU and EEC coordinate their permit supply to maximize joint profits forming a
sellers’ cartel. This is in effect a monopoly, and the members of the cartel share
the monopolistic profits. All other regions behave as price takers, i.e. they
minimize their abatement costs given the permit price set by the two regions.
NASH FSU and EEC behave non-cooperatively and do not coordinate their permit
supply. Instead, they act independently of each other, with each region
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attempting to maximize its profit by choosing its own permit supply. This
structure on the permits market is analyzed for a duopoly competing in
quantities using the Nash equilibrium concept.
MONOP Only FSU acts as a monopoly. EEC is treated as a competitive fringe (price
taker) following the price leadership of the dominant supplier FSU.
6. Simulation results
A. NOTRADE
Without emissions trading, each Annex 1 country must meet its Kyoto abatement
commitment as indicated in Table 1 by solely undertaking domestic abatement actions. The
autarkic marginal costs of abatement are 108 US$/tC for AUN, 127 US$/tC for EUR, 190
US$/tC for CAN and 187 US$/tC for JPN. The autarkic marginal abatement cost for USA in
the case of its compliance with the Kyoto Protocol is 148 US$/tC. EEC and FSU do not face
any binding abatement requirements and thus their autarkic marginal costs of abatement are
zero. The total costs of abatement without trade, which represent the areas under the marginal
abatement cost curves, are US$ 1.5 bn for AUN, US$ 2.6 bn for CAN, US$ 9.0 bn for EUR,
US$ 5.1 bn for JPN and US$ 31.3 bn for USA. In terms of relative compliance cost measured
as a percentage of the official DOE (2001) projection for GDP in 2010, EUR bears by far the
smallest compliance burden (0.08% GDP loss). With 0.27% GDP loss, CAN is hit hardest.
With the loss of US$ 31.3 bn and 0.24% GDP, the costs for USA are among the highest in
both absolute and relative terms. The total compliance costs of Annex 1 countries including
the US amount to US$ 49.5 bn (0.15% GDP loss). With respect to the environmental
effectiveness, the absence of the US ratification leads to a real emission reduction of 298 MtC
(7.0% effective reduction from the total Annex 1 baseline emissions in 2010), whereas an
effective emission reduction with the US ratification amounts to 812 MtC, or 19.0% below
the total Annex 1 baseline emissions in 2010.
In what follows, we will discuss the effects of emissions trading under the different
policy scenarios considered subsequently. Unless otherwise specified, all the numbers cited in
this section are given in Table 3.
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B. TRADE – The effects of Annex 1 emissions trading under perfect competition
TRADE w/o US
In the absence of the US ratification, the price of permits under perfect Annex 1
trading equals zero – assuming no transaction costs – since the amount of hot air exceeds the
total amount of the revised emissions reductions required of all remaining Kyoto-constrained
Annex 1 regions. None of the remaining Annex 1 countries with effective abatement
requirements abate domestically at all, and their total compliance costs for meeting the
revised Kyoto emissions targets are zero. Their total gains from emissions trading, namely the
reductions in the total compliance costs relative to the no emissions trading case, amount to
US$ 18.2 bn (0.09% of GDP). But the magnitude of the gain of each region depends on the
relative differential between its autarkic marginal cost and the market price of permits. Ceteris
paribus, regions whose autarkic marginal costs differ significantly from the trading
equilibrium price (i.e. EUR, JPN) trade more and thus benefit more than those regions with
autarkic marginal abatement costs closer to the permit price (of zero), i.e. AUN.10 The same
reasoning applies to permit exporters. The farther away the permit price is from the autarkic
marginal abatement costs, the more revenues they are able to receive from selling excess
permits. With perfect competition, the autarkic marginal abatement costs of permit exporters
FSU and EEC equal the permit price. Consequently, these two regions do not benefit at all
from emissions trading.
It should be pointed out that while all remaining Kyoto-constrained Annex 1 regions
benefit from excess supply of hot air from FSU and EEC in the absence of the US ratification,
the environmental effectiveness under unconstrained Annex 1 trading drops to zero in
comparison with a reduction of 19.0% from the total Annex 1 baseline emissions in 2010 in
the case where all Annex 1 countries, including the US, ratify the Kyoto Protocol and trading
across Annex 1 countries is not allowed. In other words, under unrestricted emissions trading,
Kyoto comes at no costs because the world economy and its emissions develop as in the
business-as-usual case. The total Annex 1 carbon emissions in 2010 remain unchanged at
about 2.5 gigatons of carbon (GtC).
                                               
10
 Under this scenario, all regions just trade their emission reduction requirements. Therefore, the trade volume is
larger for AUN than for CAN.
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TRADE w/t US
When all Annex 1 countries, including the US, are allowed to trade emissions permits,
the marginal cost of domestic abatement for each Annex 1 region equalizes. The resulting
market price of permits is equal to US$ 41 per ton of carbon. The total market size (i.e. total
volume of traded permits) is estimated at 482 MtC. All Kyoto-constrained Annex 1 regions
are permit importers: AUN demands 16.6 MtC, CAN 21.8 MtC, EUR 94.7 MtC, JPN 43.5
MtC and USA 305.6 MtC. By contrast, all Kyoto-unconstrained Annex 1 regions are permit
exporters: EEC supplies 89.4 MtC and FSU 392.8 MtC. Unlike the case of US non-
ratification, both regions sell not just hot air, but are also involved in domestic abatement
actions: EEC abates 33.1 MtC and FSU 97.3 MtC domestically. The total Annex 1
compliance costs are reduced from US$ 49.5 bn in the case of no emissions trading
(NOTRADE) to US$ 7.7 bn with trading. At the same time, trading across all Annex 1
countries leads to a real emission reduction of 460 MtC, or 10.8% below the total Annex 1
baseline emissions in 2010.
C. CARTEL – EEC and FSU coordinate permit supply
Our first specification of non-competitive behavior looks at the cooperative solution.
The strategies of EEC and FSU are coordinated so as to attain the best result for the group. In
so doing, they form a cartel and act as a monopoly in order to maximize its profit from permit
sales, which is then divided among themselves by some prearranged rule. The cartel faces the
downward sloping residual demand curve (the curve D in Figure 5). The aggregate cartel
restricts the supply of permits until the marginal revenue from permit sales is equal to
marginal abatement cost, i.e. equal to zero for hot air supply. At this point, the higher price
just compensates for the decrease in the quantity exported, and the demand elasticity is equal
to unity. The more inelastic the demand curve facing the cartel, the higher the price the cartel
can set and the greater its profit. Monopolization has the expected effects: the cartel supplies
only 126 MtC permits to the market. The market price with monopolistic supply is raised to
66 US$/tC in comparison with zero in the absence of the US ratification under perfect Annex
1 trading. This is the maximum price that can be attained with supply side restrictions.
Consequently, gains from trading are reduced from US$ 18.2 bn under perfect competition to
US$ 13.4 bn under a supply cartel (see Table 3). This is mainly because Kyoto-constrained
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Annex 1 regions suffer from a substantial loss (US$ 13.1 bn) in comparison with the case of
perfectly competitive trade.
The loss of Kyoto-constrained Annex 1 regions is split up into incurred cost of
domestic abatement and transfers made to permit suppliers. The increased resource costs due
to domestic abatement add up to 4.8 bn US$: US$ 0.6 bn for AUN (24 MtC), US$ 0.4 bn for
CAN (15 MtC), US$ 2.9 bn for EUR (104 MtC) and US$ 0.8 bn for JPN (29 MtC). The total
expenditures for permit purchases amount to US$ 8.3 bn: US$ 0.6 bn for AUN (10 MtC),
US$ 1.1 bn for CAN (17 MtC), US$ 4.2 bn for EUR (64 MtC), and US$ 2.3 bn for JPN (35
MtC). Despite the efficiency losses, all Kyoto-constrained Annex 1 regions are still better off
with emissions trading under a supply cartel than under no trading at all. In comparison with
the case of no emissions trading, they gain US$ 5.2 bn: AUN gains US$ 0.2 bn, CAN US$ 1.0
bn, EUR US$ 1.9 bn and JPN US$ 2.0 bn.
Expenditures for permit purchases are transferred to the cartel suppliers EEC and FSU.
Thus, the total (maximum) gain of the cartel equals the total expenditures for permit
purchases, which amount to US$ 8.3 bn. In comparison with zero profits from permit sales
under a perfect competition, such dramatic increases in profits enhance the incentive for the
two regions to coordinate their permit sales. The cartel must decide how the monopoly profit
of the cartel is to be divided among EEC and FSU. The range of possible cooperative
solutions can be narrowed down. The payoffs to the two participants cannot add up to more
than US$ 8.3 bn. Since each region can choose to go alone, neither will accept a payoff less
than under the NASH scenario derived later (US$ 3.1 bn for EEC and US$ 4.4 bn for FSU).
Thus, all points on the solid line AB in Figure 3 are possible solutions to the bargaining
problem (solution set). There have been several cooperative game solution concepts proposed.
We consider only the egalitarian solution here. The symmetric or even split point is given by
E (US$ 0.4 bn for EEC, US$ 0.4 bn for FSU). The profit of EEC amounts then to US$ 3.5 bn,
that of FSU to 4.8 bn US$. It is undecided, however, how much is supplied to the market by
each region. If, for example, EEC supplies its 56 MtC of hot air, it receives 3.7 bn US$ from
permit sales and must pay US$ 0.2 bn as a side payment to FSU. Given the larger bargaining
power by FSU, the cooperative solution may lay more towards point A.
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Figure 3  Imputation of monopolistic profits
Under a monopolistic cartel supply, all Kyoto-constrained Annex 1 regions’ demand
for permits drop from 298 MtC under a perfect competition to 126 MtC. This means that 172
MtC of hot air are suppressed. Annex 1 emissions are reduced from 2.5 GtC to about 2.3 GtC,
i.e. the environmental effectiveness of the Kyoto protocol is increased by market power on the
supply side. Generally speaking, the derived results are expected to be sensitive to the
assumptions about the amount of hot air. While this may be particularly the case under the no
trade scenario (NOTRADE), the amount of hot air is a far less critical factor under the
monopolistic cartel supply examined here, since in this case FSU and EEC supply the
complete market with only 126 MtC, i.e. about one third of the hot air assumed in the
calculations.
The formation of a permit supply cartel does not seem implausible. The cartel has a
good ability to raise permit prices since the demand curve is relatively vertical (inelastic). No
workable punishment is foreseen to be put in place, since EEC and FSU can otherwise bank
their excess hot air permits for subsequent commitment periods as allowed under Article 3.13
of the Kyoto Protocol. The organizational costs are low, in particular due to the regular
meetings at the Conference of Parties (COP). But each member of the cartel has an incentive
to supply more permits than is best for the cartel collectively. As a result, the cartel tends to
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break apart. Whether this is going to happen depends on the regions’ willingness to commit
themselves to efficiently coordinated strategies, which in turn boils down to the design of an
international emissions trading scheme. This is the greatest challenge ahead for EEC and FSU
to reap monopolistic profits from coordinating their permit sales, given that the two regions
comprise of a number of countries.
D. NASH: EEC and FSU as a Cournot duopoly
The second specification of non-competitive behavior assumes that EEC and FSU act
independently of each other, and each region attempts to maximize its profit by choosing its
own permit supply. We use a Cournot model of duopoly, where the two regions
simultaneously set their quantity supplied to the permits market. Both regions have to
consider their rival region’s behavior to determine their own optimal choice of permit supply.
The maximum profit action by one region, given its beliefs about the action taken by its rival,
is represented by the best-response (or reaction) function. A Nash equilibrium corresponds
with an intersection of the two best-response functions. In the Nash equilibrium, no player has
an incentive to deviate from his prescribed strategy. Each region sells the quantity of permits
that maximizes its profits given its (correct) beliefs about other regions’ choice of permit
supply. Reaction curves are drawn in Figure 4. The best response function of FSU (BRFSU)
has two significant points: if EEC supplies zero permits, FSU provides 126 MtC. This is the
cartel (monopoly) output level, since a Cournot player without competition faces the market
demand curve. If EEC supplies 298 MtC, the total emission reduction required of the Kyoto-
constrained Annex 1 regions, FSU provides zero permits. However, the two regions are not
identical. FSU has hot air of 296 MtC and will not be engaged in any abatement activities.
EEC, on the other hand, has hot air of only 56 MtC. The permit exports beyond the amount of
hot air are generated by undertaking domestic abatement efforts to earn additional profits.
EEC abates domestically up to the point where the marginal abatement cost of generating one
additional permit equals its marginal revenue. This is the reason why the best response
function of EEC (BREEC) is kinked: the best response function is symmetric to the one of FSU
if only hot air is supplied, but differs in the case of domestic abatement efforts by EEC. If
FSU supplies zero permits, EEC provides only 87 MtC, i.e. hot air of 56 MtC and an
additional 31 MtC resulting from domestic abatement action. Again, if FSU supplies 298
MtC, EEC offers zero permits. In the Nash equilibrium, FSU exports permits of 96 MtC and
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EEC permits of 70 MtC. The total market supply of permits amounts to 166 MtC, and the
corresponding price of permits equals 46 US$/tC. In comparison with the scenario CARTEL,
the market supply of permits under the Nash competition is increased by 40 MtC and the price
of permits is reduced by 20 US$/tC. The profits are US$ 4.4 bn for FSU and US$ 3.1 bn for
EEC in the Nash equilibrium. The costs of meeting the revised Kyoto targets are US$ 1.0 bn
for AUN, US$ 1.2 bn for CAN, US$ 5.6 bn for EUR and US$ 2.3 bn for JPN. Summing over
these costs minus the profits of FSU and EEC leads to the total remaining Annex 1
compliance cost of US$ 2.6 bn. In comparison with that of US$ 4.8 bn under CARTEL, this
total compliance cost under NASH is almost cut in half.
Figure 4  EEC and FSU as a Cournot duopoly
E. MONOP – Only FSU exercises monopoly power
Under the last imperfect competition scenario, only FSU is assumed to exercise
market power, while EEC is assumed to be a price taker on the permit market. This
assumption seems realistic given the dominant position of Russia and the Ukraine on the
supply side of the international emissions trading market. The small supplier EEC is then
treated as a competitive fringe and follows the price leadership of the dominant region FSU.
In this case, FSU knows how much EEC supplies at any given price and adjusts the residual
demand curve accordingly. Acting as a monopoly, FSU supplies 102 MtC at a price of 36
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US$/tC. The maximum monopolistic profit of FSU is reduced to US$ 3.6 bn from 4.4 bn US$
under NASH and 4.8 bn US$ under CARTEL. The fringe supplier EEC delivers 86 MtC to
the market and gets a profit of US$ 2.6 bn (US$ 3.1 bn revenues from sales less US$ 0.5 bn
costs of abatement) in comparison with US$ 3.1 bn under NASH and US$ 3.5 bn under
CARTEL. The total volume of permits traded between the hot air suppliers and the other
Annex 1 regions increases to 188 MtC from 126 MtC under CARTEL and 166 MtC under
NASH. The total costs of all remaining Kyoto-constrained Annex 1 regions meeting the
Kyoto abatement requirements are reduced to US$ 8.4 bn: US$ 0.9 bn for AUN, US$ 1.0 bn
for CAN, US$ 4.6 bn for EUR and US$ 1.9 bn for JPN.
Table 3 summarizes the results of the different policy simulations undertaken, and
Figure 5 illustrates these quantitative results. Our results show that there is ample space for
non-competitive supply behavior under Annex 1 emissions trading. Without the US
participation, the residual demand of all remaining Kyoto-constrained Annex 1 regions is
given by the curve D. Under competitive Annex 1 emissions trading TRD/US, FSU and EEC
supply hot air in excess of market demand. If FSU and EEC together exercise monopoly
power (CARTEL), they sell hot air permits until the marginal revenues of permit sales (MR)
are equal to the marginal costs of abatement, which are zero. If only FSU exercises monopoly
power and EEC is treated as a fringe supplier (MONOP), FSU perceives the permit demand
curve D/EEC. FSU sells hot air until the marginal revenues of permit sales (MR/EEC) equal zero.
As indicated in Figure 5, the market equilibrium under Nash lies just between the CARTEL
and the MONOP solutions on the market demand curve D. Clearly, the supply restrictions
imposed as a result of different degree of monopoly power on the permit market all result in,
to some extent, an increase in the international permit price and real emission reduction. With
the US participation, the residual demand curve faced by the suppliers FSU and EEC with
supply curve S is depicted by the curve DUS. In this case, the competitive permit market
equilibrium is given by TRDUS.
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Table 3 Implications of the non-competitive supply behavior for the permits market,
compliance costs and the environmental effectiveness in 2010
NTR TRD w/o US TRD w/t US CARTEL NASH MONOP
Absolute cost of compliance (bn US$)
AUN 1.5 0 1.0 1.3 1.0 0.9
CAN 2.6 0 1.1 1.6 1.2 1.0
EEC 0 0 – 3.1 – 3.5 f – 3.1 – 2.6
EUR 9.0 0 5.1 7.1 5.6 4.6
FSU 0 0 – 14.4 – 4.8 f – 4.4 – 3.6
JPN 5.1 0 2.1 3.1 2.3 1.9
Total w/o US 18.2 0 – 4.8 2.6 2.1
USA 31.3 – 15.9 – – –
Total w/t US 49.5 – 7.7 – – –
Relative cost of compliance (% of business-as-usual GDP in 2010)
AUN 0.22 0 0.14 0.19 0.15 0.13
CAN 0.27 0 0.12 0.16 0.12 0.10
EEC 0 0 – 0.51 – 0.57 f – 0.52 – 0.44
EUR 0.08 0 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.04
FSU 0 0 – 1.66 – 0.55 f – 0.51 – 0.42
JPN 0.11 0 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.04
Total w/o US 0.09 0 – 0.02 0.01 0.01
USA 0.24 – 0.12 – – –
Total w/t US a 0.15 – 0.02 – – –
Absolute real emission reduction (MtC)
AUN 33.7 0 17.2 24.0 18.6 15.6
CAN 32.5 0 10.6 15.1 11.5 9.6
EEC 0 0 33.1 0 13.7 30.1
EUR 167.9 0 73.2 104.1 79.6 66.4
FSU 0 0 97.3 0 0 0
JPN 64.0 0 20.4 29.3 22.3 18.5
Total w/o US 298.0 0 – 172.4 145.6 140.2
USA 513.8 – 208.1 – – –
Total w/t US 811.8 – 459.9 – – –
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Table 3 continued.
NTR TRD w/o US TRD w/t US CARTEL NASH MONOP
Relative real emission reduction (% from business-as-usual in 2010)
AUN 25.9 0 13.2 18.4 14.3 12.0
CAN 19.7 0 6.4 9.1 7.0 5.8
EEC 0 0 15.8 0 6.6 14.4
EUR 16.1 0 7.0 10.0 7.7 6.4
FSU 0 0 16.4 0 0 0
JPN 19.3 0 6.2 8.8 6.7 5.6
Total w/o US 7.0 0 – 4.0 3.4 3.3
USA 28.4 – 11.5 – – –
Total w/t US b 19.0 – 10.8 – – –
Amount of hot air emitted into the atmosphere (MtC)
Total w/o US 0 298.0 – 125.6 152.4 157.8
Total w/t US 0 – 351.9 – – –
Market price (US$/tC)
–
 c 0 40.7 65.9 45.6 35.6
Market size (MtC)
–
 c 298.0 482.2 125.6 166.0 188.1
Permit trade (MtC) d
AUN – 33.7 16.6 9.7 15.1 18.1
CAN – 32.5 21.8 17.4 20.9 22.8
EEC – · e – 89.4 · e – 70.0 – 86.4
EUR – 167.9 94.7 63.8 88.3 101.5
FSU – · e – 392.8 · e – 96.0 – 101.8
JPN – 64.0 43.5 34.7 41.7 45.5
USA – – 305.6 – – –
a Percentage change with respect to aggregate Annex 1 business-as-usual GDP in 2010.
b Percentage change with respect to total Annex 1 baseline emissions in 2010 including the US emissions.
c Autarkic marginal abatement costs are 108 US$/tC for AUN, 190 US$/tC for CAN, 127 US$/tC for EUR, 187
US$/tC for JPN and 148 US$/tC for USA.
d Positive values indicate permit imports, negative values indicate permit exports.
e Permit exports by EEC and FSU are undetermined. Under TRD w/o US total permit supply is 298 MTC, while
the corresponding figure under CARTEL equals 126 MtC.
f If cartel profits are split up following the egalitarian solution.
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Figure 5  Graphical illustration of the results
7. Conclusions and further research
The US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol topples the balance of the buyers and
sellers on the international market of tradable permits. With the over-supply of permits, it
seems likely that sellers would adapt their behavior to the weaker demand for emissions
permits to maximize their gains. Taking account of sinks credits as agreed in Bonn and
Marrakech, this paper has illustrated how market power could be exerted in the absence of the
US ratification under Annex 1 trading and has explored the potential implications of the non-
competitive supply behavior for the international market of tradable permits, compliance costs
for the remaining Annex 1 countries to meet their revised Kyoto targets, and the
environmental effectiveness.
As the largest carbon emitter in the world, the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol
has had by far the greatest impact on the environmental effectiveness of the Protocol. This
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would lead to no real emission reduction in any of the remaining Annex 1 regions, whereas
the ratification of all Annex 1 regions, including the US, would result in the real emission
reduction of 812 MtC or 19.0% below the total Annex 1 baseline emissions in 2010 (if trading
across Annex 1 countries were not allowed) and of 460 MtC or 10.8% below the total Annex
1 baseline emissions in 2010 (if trading across Annex 1 countries were allowed). As the
biggest single buyer on the international market of tradable permits, the absence of the US
ratification would significantly reduce the demand for permits. As a consequence, the price of
permits under Annex 1 trading would drop from US$ 40.7 per ton of carbon with US
ratification to zero without the US ratification. All remaining Kyoto-constrained Annex 1
countries could benefit from the excess supply of hot air from FSU and EEC and meet their
Kyoto targets at zero costs. But seller countries would lose all their revenues under perfect
Annex 1 trading.
Given FSU and EEC as the dominant suppliers of emissions permits on the
international market, it is certainly not in their interest to sell excess emissions permits at zero
price. Instead, they may exert market power to maximize their revenues from selling permits.
Our results show that such supply restrictions by exploiting market power results in
substantial economic losses for all remaining Kyoto-constrained Annex 1 regions in
comparison with the case of perfectly competitive supply, while it generates substantial
financial flows to FSU. Depending on how market power is exerted under Annex 1 trading,
the overall compliance costs of all remaining Annex 1 regions in the case where FSU and
EEC form a sellers’ cartel (CARTEL) could reach as much as two times that in the case where
only FSU acts as a monopoly (MONOP). But no matter how market power is exerted under
Annex 1 trading, all Kyoto-constrained Annex 1 regions are better off with emissions trading
in terms of their compliance costs than with no trading at all. Moreover, curtailing permit
supply by market power will cut the amount of hot air being emitted into the atmosphere by
more than half and at the same time, increases Annex 1 domestic abatement efforts. Thus, the
overall environmental effectiveness is increased in comparison with the case of perfectly
competitive supply, although real emissions reductions are much less effective under the
market power scenarios examined here than in the case of the ratification of all Annex 1
regions including the US.
There are several aspects that warrant further investigation. First, our analysis focuses
on the first commitment period, and does not consider the possibility of banking of permits. It
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is conceivable that a low price in the first commitment period will induce sellers to defer
portion of their emissions permits for use in subsequent periods (Manne and Richels, 2001).
Such flexibility is particularly attractive if sellers expect much higher prices of permits in the
subsequent periods due to a further tightening of emissions targets, reentry of the US to the
Kyoto Protocol, and/or higher compliance costs encountered by themselves as their
economies are expected to begin recovering in the subsequent commitment periods. Second,
our analysis is based on a partial equilibrium framework, ignoring other potential effects of
non-competitive supply behavior, notably the potential negative terms-of-trade
consequences.11 Thus, it would be interesting to identify the sources of the differences
between the partial equilibrium results and the respective general equilibrium results, and to
quantify their significance.
It should be pointed out that our analysis only examines the issue of market power on
the supply side under Annex 1 trading. Some analysts (e.g., Böhringer and Löschel, 2001)
suggest considering the possibility of expanding emissions trading to include developing
countries via CDM to diminish FSU and EEC’s ability to exercise market power.
Incorporating developing countries into an international emissions trading scheme not only
increases the number of market participants, but also makes more cheap permits available.
Both effects reduce FSU and EEC’s ability to exert market power. But the point is that the US
withdrawal leaves plenty of excess hot air of zero costs. This will substantially reduce
incentives to invest in CDM projects that imply reduced financial flows channeled to
developing countries through CDM. Thus, developing countries might not oppose such a
supply side cartelization so that they can benefit from the corresponding high price of permits.
After all, their certified emission reductions from CDM projects, although less costly than the
equivalent amount of abatement undertaken within Annex 1 purchasing countries, are not
made available at zero costs. Some OECD countries, particularly those more concerned about
the environmental effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol, would also not necessarily interfere
with such a move, as it would compel the remaining Kyoto-constrained Annex 1 countries to
                                               
11
 For example, monopolistic pricing on the international permits market influences the prices and quantities of
other goods traded internationally. Such effects are transmitted through the trade channels to other trading
partners. The resulting feedback effects on the monopolist, for example Russia, who is dependent heavily on oil
and gas exports, are that it could lose in relative terms from setting higher permit prices through its negative
impact on international oil and gas prices. Based on general equilibrium models, earlier studies on compliance
with the original Kyoto emissions targets (e.g., Bernstein et al., 1999; Burniaux, 1998; MacCracken et al., 1999)
have assessed such potential effects of market power.
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undertake otherwise very little domestic abatement actions and at the same time, would still
reduce their costs of compliance.
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Appendix A: The original Kyoto GHG emission reduction targets and the revised
targets under the Bonn Agreement and the Marrakech Accords
Labela Target w/o sinksb Sinks creditsc Targets w/t sinksd
Australia AUN 108 2.7 110.7
Austria EUR 87 4.0 91
Belgium EUR 92.5 1.1 93.6
Bulgaria EEC 92 2.1 94.1
Canada CAN 94 11.2 105.2
Czech Republic EEC 92 1.6 93.6
Denmark EUR 79 1.2 80.2
Estonia EEC 92 1.9 93.9
Finland     EUR 100 1.8 101.8
France   EUR 100 1.6 101.6
Germany EUR 79 1.4 80.4
Greece EUR 125 1.3 126.3
Hungary EEC 94 2.2 96.2
Iceland EUR 110 8.0 118
Ireland    EUR 113 1.4 114.4
Italy     EUR 93.5 1.1 94.6
Japan     JPN 94 4.9 98.9
Latvia EEC 92 2.9 94.9
Liechtenstein EUR 92 15.1 107.1
Lithuania EEC 92 3.0 95
Luxembourg EUR 72 1.4 79.4
Monaco     EUR 92 1.0 93
Netherlands EUR 94 1.0 95
New Zealand AUN 100 2.0 102
Norway     EUR 101 3.8 104.8
Poland    EEC 94 1.7 95.7
Portugal EUR 127 2.2 129.2
Romania EEC 92 2.8 94.8
Russian Federation FSU 100 5.0 105
Slovakia EEC 92 3.5 95.5
Slovenia EEC 92 7.9 99.9
Spain   EUR 115 1.8 116.8
Sweden     EUR 104 4.0 108
Switzerland EUR 92 4.5 96.5
Ukraine FSU 100 1.4 101.4
United Kingdom EUR 87.5 1.3 88.8
United States USA 93 3.3 96.3
a Label used to correspond to those Annex 1 countries covered in each aggregate region modelled.
b As % of 1990 GHG emissions (UNFCCC, 1997).
c Total allowed sink credits agreed in Bonn and Marrakech as % of 1990 GHG emissions (Nemry, 2001).
d As % of 1990 GHG emissions.
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Appendix B: Algebraic model description
This section provides an algebraic summary of the marginal abatement costs-based,
partial equilibrium model for emissions trading underlying the simulations. We begin with the
model formulation for a competitive system of emissions trading accounting for hot air, i.e.
the scenario TRADE. Then, we lay out the set-up for the case of non-competitive permit
supply behavior. The model for the scenarios CARTEL and MONOP is described first.
Finally, the model set-up for the scenario NASH is specified.
B.1. Competitive emissions trading with hot air: TRADE
Under competitive emissions trading, all countries are price takers. Each country i
minimizes its compliance costs to some exogenous target level ki. Compliance costs equal the
sum of abatement costs and the costs of buying carbon permits; in the case of permit sales, the
second term becomes negative, which means that the country minimizes the cost of abatement
minus the income from selling permits. A country with hot air (hi) is always selling permits.
Costs are minimized subject to the constraint that a country meets its exogenous reduction
target. In other words: a country’s initial endowment of permits plus the amount of permits
bought or sold on the market (qi) may not exceed the emission target level ki:
( )min + − + ⋅
i
i i i i iq
C h e e P q (1)
 s.t.   i i ie k q= + ,
where
Ci denotes the abatement cost function for reducing carbon emissions,
ie stands for the business-as-usual emissions,
ei are the actual emissions, and
P is the permit price taken as exogenous.
The amount of hot air equals the difference between the emission target and the business-as-
usual emissions:
= +i i ik h e . (2)
The first order condition for the cost minimization problem yields:
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( )i i i iC h e e P′ + − = . (3)
In the optimum, the price taking countries abate emissions up to a level where their marginal
abatement costs (C´) equal the permit price. Total costs of reducing emissions to the overall
target level K  ki are minimized, since all opportunities for exploiting cost differences in
abatement across countries are taken. The existence of hot air does not change the cost-
efficiency property of unrestricted competitive emission trading, since marginal abatement
costs are still equalized. However, hot air sold on the permit market does not imply any
effective (real) emission reduction in the hot air countries. The occurrence of traded hot air,
therefore, results in an increase of overall emission compared to a situation without
international emissions trading.
B.2. Non-competitive permit supply behavior
CARTEL and MONOP
Monopolistic permit supply is assumed under the scenarios CARTEL and MONOP. It
is characterized as a situation in which one region (denoted “m”) has supply power on the
permit market while all other countries, denoted as fringe “f”, behave as price takers. The
monopoly region under the scenario CARTEL consists of the coordinating regions EEC and
FSU, while it is only FSU under the scenario MONOP. In the latter case, EEC is assumed to
be part of the fringe. The fringe countries minimize their compliance costs given the permit
price set by the monopolist. They emit carbon until the marginal costs of abatement equal the
permit price:
( )f f f fC h e e P′ + − = . (1’)
The aggregate permit demand of the fringe, which is in total a net importer of permits, is:
( ) ( )F f
f
Q P q P= ∑ . (4)
The monopolist sets its permit supply (qm<0) to minimize abatement costs minus income from
permit sales:
( )min + − + ⋅
m
m m m m mq
C h e e P q (5)
 s.t. m m me k q= +
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( )FP P Q= ,
where P is the inverse demand function of the fringe countries. The first order condition of the
cost minimization problem indicates that the monopolist sets marginal abatement costs equal
to marginal revenue:
( ) ( )m m m m F mC h e e P P Q q′ ′+ − = − ⋅ . (6)
Comparing Equation 1’ with Equation 6, we see that marginal abatement costs are not
equalized between the fringe countries and the monopolist, thus resulting in overall efficiency
losses due to market power.
NASH
Under the scenario NASH it is assumed that EEC and FSU set simultaneously their
quantity supplied to the permit market given one region’ beliefs about the action taken by its
rival. Each region, denoted “n”, sets its permit supply ( )nq  to minimize abatement costs
minus income from permit sales given the choice of permit supply by the other region,
denoted “-n”:
( )min
n
n n n n nq
C h e e P q+ − + ⋅ (7)
s.t. n n ne k q= +
( )F nP P Q q−= − ,
where P is the inverse demand function of the fringe countries (Equation 4) taking into
account the other region’s permit supply ( )nq− . The first order condition for the cost
minimization problem yields:
( ) ( )n n n n F n nC h e e P P Q q q−′ ′+ − = − − ⋅ , (8)
resulting in the best-response (or reaction) function for the region n (BRn). The best-response
function for the region –n (BR
–n) can be derived accordingly. A Nash equilibrium corresponds
to the intersection of the best response functions of EEC and FSU.
